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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a portfolio optimization approach to information technology (IT) 
security investment decisions in an organization. This approach has been motivated by 
the extreme variations that are found in IT security requirements for organizations in 
addition to the diversity of starting conditions found in organizations that choose to 
embark on a formal approach to managing their security. Often, a budgetary allocation 
is made for IT security and IT managers and management are faced with the problem of 
how to allocate these monies or resources across competing projects and products that 
can potentially improve or enhance IT security in an organization. Instead of ranking or 
rating the various alternatives based on their benefits only, it is demonstrated how, by 
identifying organizational objectives, and then aligning the decisions with the objectives, 
one can optimally allocate resources across the IT security portfolio. The approach in 
this paper has been to provide a generic decision framework that can be customized by 
practitioners and fine-tuned by other researchers. The approach is explained and then 
the results are discussed using a case study. Both the strengths and weaknesses of this 
approach are highlighted and suggestions for how this approach can be deployed and 
enhanced are provided. 
 
Keywords: IT security, resource allocation, decision theory, analytic hierarchy process, 
optimization 
 
Introduction 
Spending on IT security is projected to grow by 24 percent (compounded annually) 
between 2001 and 2006 (Roberts 2003). Organizations are spending heavily not only on 
IT security but also on security in general. As the IS function matures, many 
organizations have a formal information system plan (which may include an IT plan 
also). This implies that there exists a formal IS strategy that is aligned with the 
organizational strategy. In such cases, we can assume that the information security plan 
would be part of the larger IS plan. By implication, since the information security plan 
would be derived from, and consistent with, the IS plan, it would also be aligned with the 
organizational strategy. The issue of spending on IT security is well summed up by 
Levinson (2002) who quotes an IT professional, “we have no fear of spending money, but 
we have to do it wisely.” 
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According to Swanson et al. (2003), resource allocation responsibilities, in various forms, 
reside with the head of the organization, the CIO, the security program manager and the 
program manager or the system owner. The ultimate responsibility, however, resides with 
the head of the organization. While Swanson et al. (2003) refer to federal government 
agencies, this distribution of responsibility holds for any organization in general. The 
implication of such shared and ultimate responsibility is that every decision maker and 
(preferably) every organizational stakeholder needs to understand why certain decisions 
were taken, how they were taken and the implications of such decisions going wrong. 
The problem for any manager requesting funds is to convince budgetary authorities to 
allocate the requisite resources (most typically, funds). The problem for the individual(s) 
who make the allocation decision is to understand the need for such funds and then make 
decisions well aware of the tradeoffs that may ensue. In essence, information security 
decisions, like many decisions, need first, a transparent decision process and second, a 
parsimonious way of communicating the decision framework. 
 
In essence, IT security resource allocation decisions require significant organizational 
investments. The goal of such decisions is to maximize the value of such investments 
(whether one time or ongoing). The objective of this paper is to present one such decision 
making framework that helps organizations analyze and understand their security 
concerns in addition to helping them leverage their investments in information security. 
 
The paper is presented as follows. First the IT security investment problem is described 
and definitions of key terms are provided. Then a portfolio optimization approach to the 
problem is proposed. Such and approach is justified primarily by invoking the contextual 
and unique nature of IT security needs of an organization. Then the application of this 
approach is presented using a real life case study to explain how the model was 
developed and how the results can be interpreted. The paper is concluded by pointing out 
some weaknesses of this approach as also highlighting the strengths. In addition 
suggestions for improving this framework are also made. 
Problem description 
In an organization, information security or information technology security often rears 
itself as a critical issue. This means that organizations often wake up to security problems 
when they actually encounter (or expect to encounter) a security-related incident or when 
a security incident has occurred in another organization that this proximal to itself 
increasing the likelihood of its happening in that organization. Alternatively, 
organizations can be mandated by regulatory bodies to meet minimum security standards. 
 
Budgetary processes are instrumental in driving most investment decisions in 
organizations (OMB 2005). Given that IT security-related decisions fall into the critical 
category and that there is often a regulatory deadline or high opportunity cost associated 
with making mistakes with such decisions, there are two, often, conflicting goals in this 
decision-making situation – (a) take a decision expeditiously and, at the same time, (b) 
exercise due diligence. 
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The decision is often compounded by the fact that there always so much to do when it 
comes to IT security simply because there are so many potential vulnerabilities in any 
organizational system (not just the information system). Apart from the information 
technology infrastructure (that, among other things, includes networks, databases and 
applications), organizational processes have to be made secure just as people have to be 
trained to change their security related behaviors. Not only does this take high initial 
investment, it also requires a continuous stream of recurrent investments to reinforce and 
sustain the existing standards of IT security. 
 
As a result, the IT security investment decision is one that needs to be made every year in 
order to reassess the IT security goals and realign investments (or spending) with those 
goals. The nature of organizational decision-making is not perfect. Prevailing 
organizational biases and tensions due to competing demands for the same set of 
resources and the lack of perfect information require that tradeoffs be made and in doing 
so judgments be used. Judgments are subjective and we need to encapsulate such 
subjectivity in a meaningful way. For instance, when comparing two security products 
(say, firewall), regardless of how carefully we develop criteria to compare them, there 
will eventually remain a level of subjectivity when we compare these products based on 
those criteria. More importantly, when we attempt to evaluate the “value” of an 
investment in IT security such an evaluation is necessarily multifaceted and complex.  
 
The research motivation for this paper was provided by Bodin et al. (2005) who have 
identified the need for using quantitative measures (like NPV) and Gordon and Loeb 
(2006) who have identified AHP as one of the approaches to resource allocation in IT 
security decisions. While both papers attempt to provide a basis to make meaningful 
investments for IT security, there gaps that can be addressed. For instance, Gordon and 
Loeb (2006) acknowledge that the ability to accurately estimate benefits is a key factor in 
using NPV effectively. However, as Rodewald (2005) has observed ROI is a poor metric 
to use when comparing IT security investments to investments that yield a tangible 
return. So, in this paper, a multi-attribute measure to evaluate IT security benefits is 
suggested. Secondly, Bodin et al. (2005) have suggested that the ratio of benefits to costs 
may be a better metric to employ when making resource allocation decisions in the 
context of IT security. It is shown that such an approach may not be indeed so and that 
focusing on benefits is the most optimal approach. 
Methodology 
Linear programming approach is combined with the analytical hierarchy process to 
demonstrate how IT security investments can be effectively leveraged by an organization. 
While every organization has its own specific goals IT-security related objectives, we 
present a somewhat generic approach (that can be customized by other users) by 
identifying three broad objectives (G1, G2 and G3) based on security service categories 
shown in Table 1. 
 
Security service Category Description 
Security Program (C11) 
Security Policy (C12) 
Management 
(G1) 
Management objectives: are those that have to do with 
the organization’s overall computer security program. 
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Risk Management 
(C13) 
Security Architecture 
(C14) 
Certification and 
Accreditation (C15) 
Security Evaluation of 
IT Products (C16) 
These goals are met based on how well the computer 
security program and risk are managed within the 
organization. These could include meeting regulatory 
compliance and minimize enterprise-wide disruptions. 
Contingency Planning 
(C21) 
Incident Handling 
(C22) 
Testing (C23) 
Training (C24) 
Operational 
(G2) 
Operational objectives: are focused on controls 
implemented and executed by people (as opposed to 
systems). For these goals to be met technical or 
specialized expertise that rely on management 
activities and technical controls need to be in place. 
These goals could include meeting a certain level of 
diffusion of personal firewalls in the organization and 
ensuring a certain cycle time for recovering from a 
virus attack. 
Firewalls (C31) 
Intrusion Detection 
(C32) 
Public Key 
Infrastructure (C33) 
Technical 
(G3) 
Technical objectives: have to do with security 
controls involving a computer system. These goals 
depend on the proper functioning of the system. 
These goals could include an upper bound on the 
number of successful virus attacks or ensuring that a 
certain minimum number of computers are part of a 
third-party authentication framework. 
Table 1. Security services and goals (Adapted from Grance et al., 2003, p. 5-1) 
 
The logic of the approach is that the resources being invested in IT security have to be 
aligned with the IT security goals. Once the objectives are identified and the alternatives 
identified (these are projects or initiatives that are shown in Appendix A), the criteria are 
established to evaluate how well a certain alternatives meets a particular aspect of a goal. 
These are shown in Table 1 in the first column. For instance the management objective 
has six components. For instance C23 is the third criterion for the second goal. An 
alternative is evaluated on how important it is to meeting the requirements of each 
component. Based on this the decision hierarchy that we develop is shown in Figure 1. 
The 8 alternatives (A1 through A8) are shown hanging from each of the criteria that have 
been identified. The decision hierarchy also shows that at each node we have a 
comparison matrix, the order of which is the number of elements being compared. For 
instance, at the goal node, the comparison matrix is of order 3, since there are three goals 
being compared. 
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Figure 1. The AHP hierarchy used to generate priorities for the eight projects shown in 
Appendix A 
 
The approach to constructing the AHP hierarchy in this paper departs from that adopted 
by Gordon and Loeb (2005) in that the goal of IT security is designed to be maximally 
aligned with that of the organizational goals. Hence, one does not necessarily have to 
limit themselves to technical criteria. Using this approach allows an organization to adopt 
a more integrative approach toward conceptualizing and budgeting for IT security. Using 
this tree, relative importance of the goals is measured using pair-wise comparison. This 
step is repeated for the criteria to evaluate each alternative. After prioritizing the 
objectives, the IT security alternatives are scored, using either pair-wise comparisons 
(which can be tedious) or absolute rating scales and utility curves (typically non-linear). 
Once the final priorities for the alternatives are obtained, they are subjected to sensitivity 
analysis to ensure that the judgments are valid. The complete set of results are shown in 
Appendix B. 
 
Following this, the portfolio for benefits subject to funding is optimized based on 
dependency and other constraints. The typical form for this optimization would be 
Maximize Expected value of IT security Benefits = ∑
=
n
i
iB
1
 
Subject to 
 1. Budget constraint 
 2. Dependency constraint (if x is funded, then y has to be funded or not funded) 
 3. Some projects can be partially funded while other can not be 
 4. Specific constraints 
 
Where Bi is the benefit associated with the ith project. Bis can be generated as AHP 
priorities (since they are generally qualitative) or by some other method. In this study 
ExpertChoice version 11.1.3628 was used to generate “benefit” priorities using the AHP 
hierarchy shown in Figure 1. These computations can also be accomplished using 
Microsoft Excel and the built-in optimizer (the Solver Addin). 
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Data and Analysis 
In this section the data are presented that were be used to allocate resources among IT 
security alternatives. Issues such as which projects are funded and why, what the 
tradeoffs are, what the nature of those tradeoffs are, and what are the implications of 
using different approaches to allocating resources for IT security initiatives are 
scrutinized. Table 2 shows the benefits derived using the AHP structure shown in Figure 
1 (See Appendix B). A1 through A8 are the leaf nodes for the tree shown in Figure 1. The 
available budget is taken to be $200,000 (See Appendix A). 
 
Project 
Id Project definition Benefit 
Cost 
($) 
A1 End user training (training programs and online material development) 0.082 56000
A2 End user support (firewall and anti virus software) 0.124 24000
A3 Upgrade and maintain server for firewall 0.108 25000
A4 Revise and improve security process audit and quality office process 0.078 43000
A5 Establish IT security task force (for security planning and coordination) 0.053 25000
A6 Establish separate security program office (for SOX and regulatory compliance reporting) 0.123 75000
A7 Security operations group training (5 programs per year) 0.073 59000
A8 Email spam filter enhancement 0.053 12000
Table 2. List of all the projects, their benefits and the associated costs 
 
Three approaches are presented to allocated resources across IT security projects. They 
include benefit maximization, benefit to cost ration maximization and maximization of 
benefits using linear programming. 
Benefit maximization 
When attempting to maximize benefits the project that provides the maximum benefit is 
chosen and selected to be funded. Then the project with the next highest benefit is picked 
select to be funded and this process continues till the budget is exhausted or the next 
project to be funded makes the total cost exceed the available budget. Table 3 shows that 
if project A4 is funded the total allocation exceeds the budgeted amount of $200,000. 
 
Project 
Id Benefit Cost 
Cumulative 
cost 
A2 0.124 24000 24000 
A6 0.123 75000 99000 
A3 0.108 25000 124000 
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A1 0.082 56000 180000 
A4 0.078 43000 223000 
A7 0.073 59000 282000 
A5 0.053 25000 307000 
A8 0.053 12000 319000 
Table 3. Benefits, costs and cumulative costs for the projects sorted by benefits 
 
Total benefits add up to 0.694 and the actual benefits (from the projects that were funded) 
add up to 0.437. Similarly all the benefits to cost ratios add up to 2.218E-05 and the total 
of benefits to cost ratios of projects that were actually funded add up to 1.259E-051. 
Hence the effectiveness of this allocation from a benefit maximization perspective is 
63.0%2. Similarly, the effectiveness of this allocation from a benefit to cost maximization 
standpoint is 56.8%. 
Benefit/cost ratio maximization 
The approach to maximizing the total of benefit to cost ratios is identical to the approach 
for maximizing benefits. The primary difference is that instead of using benefits to select 
projects, benefits to cost ratios are used to make the selection. Table 4 shows the projects 
sorted in descending order based on the benefit/cost ratio. The project with the highest 
benefit to cost ratio (in this case project A1) is chosen to be funded, followed by the 
project with the next highest benefit to cost ratio and this process continues till the budget 
is exhausted or till the next project to be funded makes the total allocation overshoot the 
available budget. Note that by employing this approach one is able to fit in one more 
projects into the available budget. While, budget utilization was not an explicit goal, this 
approach has been able to increase benefits in such as way that more projects are funded. 
 
Project 
Id Benefit Cost 
Benefit / 
cost 
Cumulative 
cost 
A1 0.124 24000 5.167E-06 24000 
A8 0.053 12000 4.417E-06 36000 
A3 0.108 25000 4.320E-06 61000 
A7 0.053 25000 2.120E-06 86000 
A5 0.078 43000 1.814E-06 129000 
A2 0.123 75000 1.640E-06 204000 
A4 0.082 56000 1.464E-06 260000 
A6 0.073 59000 1.237E-06 319000 
Table 4. Benefits, costs, benefits/costs and cumulative costs for the projects sorted by 
benefits/costs 
 
                                                 
1 Actual total benefits are composed of all the benefits above the dashed line in Table 3. 
Similarly actual total benefits to cost ratios are computed from the same set of projects 
that are above the dotted line. 
2 (0.437/0.694)*100 = 63.0% 
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Using this approach and as shown in section 4.1, the effectiveness of allocation from a 
benefit maximization standpoint is 59.9% and from a benefit to cost maximization 
standpoint is 80.4%. 
Benefit maximization with budget constraints 
In this approach linear programming (LP) is used to maximize benefits subject to budget 
constraints. 
 
The canonical form of the generalized LP formulation becomes 
 
Maximize IT security benefits = ∑
=
n
i
iiFB
1
 
Subject to the following constraints 
 BudgetFC
n
i
ii ≤∑
=1
 
 All Fis are integers that can take a value 0 or 1 
 
 Where 
  Bi = benefit associated with alternative i 
  Ci = cost associated with alternative i 
  Fi = decision variable associated with alternative i 
 
For this problem, Bis and Cis are obtained from the benefits and cost columns 
respectively in Table 2. Solving for Fis, we obtain the following solution: F1 = F3 = F4 = 
F5 = F7 = F8 = 1 and F2 = F6 = 0. This implies that projects/initiatives 2 and 6 are not 
funded; everything else is. Using this approach the effectiveness of allocation from a 
benefit maximization perspective is 71.76% and from the benefits to costs ratio 
standpoint is 87.03%. Table 5 summarizes the results. 
 
Effectiveness of allocation with 
respect to Approach 
Benefits Benefits/Costs Ratio 
Benefit 
maximization  63.0% 56.8% 
Benefit to cost 
maximization 59.9% 80.4% 
Linear 
Optimization  71.67% 87.03% 
Table 5. Effectiveness of three resource allocation approaches from the benefits and 
benefits/costs ratio perspectives. 
 
Table 5 clearly shows that the optimization approach is much more effective than the 
either the benefit maximization or the benefits/costs maximization approach. 
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Discussion 
The issues of how and why one obtains better resource allocation effectiveness when we 
one uses LP and why it makes sense in the context of IT security investments is taken up 
for discussion. Subsequently, how this approach has been able to meet the two decision 
objective that had identified in the beginning of the paper is taken up for discussion. 
 
In terms of IT security portfolio decision effectiveness, it is clear from Table 5 that a 
singular focus on IT security benefits fails to provide the most effective allocation policy 
for IT security resources. Figure 2 shows a comparison of IT security resource allocation 
approaches by using three efficient frontiers for each of the allocation approaches. The 
numbers above the arrows show the number of projects that can be funded using a 
particular approach. For instance using the benefits only approach (Section 4.1) we can 
only fund four projects. 
 
Figure 2. Comparative effectiveness for resource allocation strategies.  
 
Interestingly, the approach that has been advanced by Bodin et al. (2005) is shown to be 
the least effective. They propose that the ratio of benefits to costs can be used to provide 
more “bang for the buck.” However, as the second efficient frontier (based on the 
benefits/costs ratio) shows, the efficiency, in terms of maximizing benefits, is 
consistently lower than the other two approaches. So, while the effectiveness of this 
approach is more than that of relying purely on benefits to allocate resources, it is less 
effective than the LP-based resource allocation approach. While this may not always be 
so (Forman 2001), the LP-based benefit maximization approach makes sense because our 
aim is to maximize the benefits associated with IT security. The goal in the approach 
adopted in this paper is not to spend as much of the budgeted amount as possible. While 
the latter may be a realistic organizational goal (to avoid budget reductions in subsequent 
budgeting cycles, especially in organizations that practice zero-based budgeting), it is far 
4
5
6
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more important to “spread” the investment. From an IT security perspective it is more 
important to provide coverage for all identified areas of vulnerabilities than to optimize 
one or two selected areas. Therefore, it is more effective to fund two smaller IT security 
projects, the combined value for which may be (marginally) more than one large project 
that may send the cumulative cost over budget. 
 
It has been shown that the proposed method for making IT security portfolio decisions is 
parsimonious. This shows that one of the goals of decision-making in the context of IT 
security has been met. As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, one of the goals of 
decision making in the context of IT security is to take decisions expeditiously. This 
implies that a parsimonious decision making framework is needed – one that helps 
decision makers take the best decision without investing unreasonable time and 
resources. While there are alternative approaches as those suggested by Butler (2002), 
Gordon and Loeb (2006) and Cavusoglu et al. (2004), they are encumbered by the need 
to collect a large body of information that is either composed of rare events (IT security 
failures and associated estimates of costs that can be attributed to such failures) or a 
series of estimates. 
 
The suggested approach is also extensible in that if, the goal was to minimize risk, then 
instead of assessing benefits, risks could be expressly addressed. In addition, if benefits 
are combined with risks, one could compute expected benefits. This could done so by 
computing risks for each alternative using a separate AHP model and use the priorities 
that are generated as probabilities of failure (p) associated with the different project. The 
expected value of each of the alternatives could then be obtained by multiplying benefits 
by (1-p,) the probability of success. 
 
The approach to IT security decisions presented in this paper also meets the objective of 
ensuring due diligence. Identifying the organizational IT security goals and further by 
identifying the criteria that are used to evaluate how these organizational security goals 
are met, not only ensures that the decision problem is fully enumerated (from a 
completeness perspective), but also ensures that an organization responds to IT security 
issues that are specific to its context – and not generic security that form part of the “best 
practices” approach. Neubauer et al. (2005) have identified the criticality of organization-
specificity in the context of IT security related investment decisions. 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown how to formulate the IT security portfolio decision as one where 
multiple alternatives (initiatives or projects) can to be evaluated based on multiple criteria 
(some of which may be subjective) in order to meet multiple goals (many of which may 
conflict with each other). A generic approach to IT security resource allocation has been 
provided that is flexible and can be customized for any organization. In doing so, it has 
been demonstrated how IT security investments decisions can be maximally aligned with 
the organizational security goals. In addition, given the absence of a normative basis to 
judge how good a decision is, it has been shown how to optimize IT security resource 
allocation decisions keeping in mind the organizational context and other singularities 
that are specific to the decision at hand. This work can be extended and enriched by 
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incorporating constraints that are not budgetary. These include those constraints that 
involve “must fund” projects, dependency constraints (if project A is funded then project 
B has to be funded or if project A is funded then project B can not be funded) and 
constraints that allow projects to be partially funded.  
 
In summary, it is believed that the proposed approach to IT security resource allocation 
will allow an organization to maximize the value of its IT security investments, improve 
communication and alignment between IT groups, user and managers and allow It 
security planners to schedule resources more efficiently. 
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Appendix A: The security projects or initiatives 
The eight security projects of initiatives are shown below for an operating division of an 
organization that has a mature IT setup and has been according the highest importance to 
IT security as a part of its larger security and IT initiative. Since it is financial institution 
in a large urban setting on the east coast in the US, the $200,000 IT security budget for 
recurring expenditure items is considered average3. 
 
Initiative or 
project 
Description Budget 
($) 
End user training 
(training programs and 
online material 
development)  
In-house and outsourced training 
programs for selected end-users and their 
representatives. This is an recurring activity that 
needs to take place every year. The intent is to 
ensure that all end users are exposed to at least 
one such training program every two years. 
56000 
End user support 
(firewall and anti virus 
software)  
This is part of the overall help desk 
support system. This is an outsourced activity 
and 2 FTEs (full time equivalent) are budgeted 
for this activity. 
24000 
Upgrade and 
maintain server for 
firewall 
The bundled cost for the server, 
installation and testing along with the annual 
cost of maintaining it is reflected. 
25000 
Revise and 
improve security process 
audit and quality office 
process 
Security processes need to be revised 
constantly. One half FTE (internal) is budgeted 
for this activity. 43000 
Establish IT 
security task force (for 
security planning and 
coordination)  
The IT security task force needs to meet 
every month and take decisions on the direction 
of IT security and liaise with external bodies like 
regulatory agencies, standards bodies and key 
business partners. The cost reflects coordination, 
administrative and meeting costs. 
25000 
Establish separate 
security program office 
(for SOX and regulatory 
compliance reporting) 
This requires specific attention to IT 
security from the standpoint of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. This office will form the interface between 
IT security, internal audit and the quality group. 
One FTE and office and administrative expenses 
are budgeted. 
95000 
                                                 
3 In general, organizations tend to spend 3 percent to 6 percent of total IT spending on IT 
security (Wheatman et al., 2005). 
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Security operations 
group training (5 
programs per year)  
This is the set of annual training program 
for the internal IT security group professionals. 
Five programs attended by five persons each and 
their travel and expenses are budgeted for. 
59000 
Email spam filter 
enhancement.  
Email spam has been a source of constant 
problems. Enhancements of the software and 
part- manpower are reflected in this budgeted 
figure. 
12000 
 
Appendix B: Screenshots for computing sample priorities 
 
 
 
 
Figure B2.1 shows how priorities (benefits) associated with alternatives were computed. 
The screenshot shows a specific scenario (not the one used for computations in the body 
of the paper). The goal is shown as “Maximize IT security Portfolio.” The three 
objectives have to do with meeting management, operational and technical benefits. The 
criteria used to assess the extent to which requirements are met (and benefits captured) 
are shown as the leaf nodes on the tree on the left. The number alongside each of the 
elements shows the importance of the elements. For instance, in this case, the operational 
objectives are rated as .672 while the management and technical objectives are rated as 
.063 and .265 respectively. The advantage of these ratio scales is that we can say the 
Figure B2.1. Screen showing the goal, objectives, criteria and alternatives 
The Tenth Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2006) 
 
 299
operation objective is 2.5 (.672/.265 = 2.54) times more important than the technical 
objective and the technical objectives are four times (.265/.063 = 4.21) more important 
than the management objectives. The criteria for each of the objectives are interpreted the 
same way. For instance, from a management perspective, certification and accreditation 
is 1.2 (.201/.163 = 1.23) times more important than the security architecture; or from a 
technical perspective, the benefits of intrusion detection (in general) is computed to be 
one-third (.230/.672 = .342) as important as firewalls. 
 
In the same way, the items on the right side of the screenshot in Figure B2.1 show the 
alternatives and their priorities (benefits). The most important project (i.e. the one with 
the highest relative benefits is “Revise and improve security process audit and quality 
office process ” followed by “Upgrade and maintain server for firewall.” These final 
ratings for benefits were produced by providing ratings for each of the alternatives based 
on each of the criteria as shown in Figure B2.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B2.2. Screen showing the alternatives and how they were rated based on each criterion 
